ty.
Narveson was the first influential philosopher to reply to Regan and Singer.
I
thought it important to show that Narveson I s
critique of animal rights failed ~e~ in its
own terms.
Whether or not my reading of the
philosophical landscape was correct and whether or not my arguments were successful are
questions that can be debated.
But it is
churlish in the extreme to fault me for even
attempting such a refutation of Narveson.

Dale Jamieson
University of Colorado
In "Rational Egoism, Animal Rights, and
the Academic Connection" (Between the Species
1/2 (1985), pp. 21-7), Dr. George Cave replies to an article of mine that appeared in
a philosophical journal in 1981 ("Rational
Egoism
and Animal Rights, " Environmental
Ethics 3 (1981), pp. 167-71). In the course
of Dr. Cave's reply--the second which he has
published in response to my rab~er modest
article (the first being a review in Ethics ~
Animals 2 (1981), pp. 61-3)--he accuses me of
"e.:-.."treme quibbling," says that my arguments
are "thoroughly speciesist," and claims that
some of my proposed counter-examples "[resemble] the paranoid speculations which underlie
the domino theory in politics.
Dr. Cave's
conclusion is that "it is rrorally repugnant
to see philosophers engaging in gratuitous
debates on highly technical and pragmatically
irrelevant aspects of the moral issue of
animal rights, or sowing the seeds of doubt
concerning the justifiability of human treatment of non-human animals for no other reason
than idle =iosity." Such pernicious behavior, of which, presumably, I am an exemplar,
"serves only to drain liberation movements of
their life-blood, and if not actually immoral, [is] at least utterly devoid of all redeeming moral conviction."

Dr. Cave is concerned about "the danger
of enervation faced by any liberation movement when its issues become the focus of
debate within the academic context." I am
sympathetic to Dr. Cave's concern.
But the
danger of "enervation" comes not from the
attention that academic philosophers have
focused on the question of animal rights but,
rather, from the twin temptations of "careeri.sm" and opportunism.
Academic philosophy and the animal liberation movement have both benefited greatly
from their close connection.
As a result of
its confrontation with the question of animal
rights, academic philosophy has become more
sensitive to the real world and more open in
its concerns (though it has a long way to
go).
From the involvement of philosophers,
the movement has gained intellectual breadth
and respectability.
It has also gained many
committed activists. Still, philosophers are
no better than anyone else, and I have no
doubt that some have been attracted to animal
rights as a way of getting a job or of building a career. Some activists have undoubtedly been attracted to the movement for similar
reasons.
People get addicted to running
organizations, having followers, seeing their
name in print, and so forth. It is important
to get people into the movement however we
can.
Still, in the long run, such careerism
and opportunism can be "enervating. "
The
only real defense against them is for all of
us to try to keep our own motivations in as
clear a view as possible. Our cornrron goal is
justice for the animals, not attention for
ourselves.
Sometimes we forget this in our
desire to set others straight.

Much of this is simply hot air and not
worth taking seriously.
Some of it is bad
faith. Who else would publish two replies to
an "extremely quibbling" article but someone
with a Ph.D.?
Still, reflecting upon Dr.
Cave's article can teach us something.
'The charge that my arguments are "incorrigibly speciesist" is reminiscent of the
ultra-leftism which took such a toll on the
ITOvements of the 1960's.
'Then, as now, tho
enemy was always within.
Nothing is more
destructive of a radical movement for social
change than this kind of divisive, ill-tempered bickering.
What seems to bother Dr. Cave is that my
article was an "internal" reply to a critic:.
of animal rights.
I tried to grant the critic (Jan Narveson) as much as possible and to
show that even so, his argument fails. Such
a strategy, if successful, can be devastating.
At the time my article was written,
1977, the animal rights view was not wellestablished within the philosophical communiBEI'WEEN THE SPECIES
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